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SUPERVISION AND COMPLIANCE OF BROKERAGE FIRMS
Christine Lazaro
Supervision is a cornerstone of broker-dealer regulation. It serves a
number of important goals: primarily ensuring that the firms follow the
governing rules and regulations so that investors can have confidence in the
firms with which they do business. Unfortunately, FINRA supervision rules
often do not set out specifically how a firm is to supervise its brokers. This
article will set forth the general supervision rules governing brokerage firms,
as well as the rules that govern specific behavior and conflicts.
Background
Brokerage firms have certain obligations to ensure that their employees
comply with applicable securities regulations. The Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 (the “34 Act”) imposes liability on a brokerage firm for an
employee’s violation of applicable rules and regulations under section
15(b)(4)(E), unless the firm can demonstrate that:
(i) there have been established procedures, and a system for applying
such procedures, which would reasonably be expected to prevent and
detect, insofar as practicable, any such violation by such other
person, and
(ii) such person has reasonably discharged the duties and obligations
incumbent upon him by reason of such procedures and system
without reasonable cause to believe that such procedures and system
were not being complied with.1
A firm may also be culpable as a control person under section 20(a) of
the ‘34 Act for an employee’s violation of applicable securities regulations if
the firm has failed to establish an adequate system of supervision.2
In addition, FINRA rules, promulgated pursuant to federal law, require
that “[e]ach member shall establish and maintain a system to supervise the
activities of each associated person that is reasonably designed to achieve

1. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (West 2017).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78t (West 2017); see CompuDyne Corp. v. Shane, 453 F. Supp. 2d
807, 830 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
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compliance with applicable securities laws and regulations, and with
applicable FINRA rules.”3
FINRA accomplishes its oversight of firm supervision through its
examination process. At the beginning of each year, FINRA issues its
regulatory and examination priorities to firms. Supervision always represents
a key component to FINRA’s priorities. Each year, FINRA’s focus shifts
slightly. For example, in 2016, FINRA focused its examination of member
firms on their overall management of conflicts of interest. FINRA
formalized its assessment of firm culture and found that the culture was
integral to a firm’s management of conflicts of interest:
A firm’s culture is both an input to and product of its supervisory system,
including its approaches to identifying and managing conflicts of interest
and ensuring the ethical treatment of customers. This means that firms
should take visible actions that help mitigate conflicts of interest, and
promote the fair and ethical treatment of customers. For example,
material breaches of firm policies and procedures should not be tolerated,
and compliance functions should be equipped with necessary resources
to help firms navigate a complex and changing regulatory and market
environment. In this regard, FINRA’s focus on firm culture is closely
related to another area of focus for 2016: supervision.4
FINRA focused its examination of a firm’s management of conflicts of
interest on four main areas: (1) incentive structures; (2) investment banking
and research business lines; (3) information leakage; and (4) position
valuation.
For 2017, FINRA focused on firms’ supervision of high-risk and
recidivist brokers.5 Specifically, FINRA examined:
[W]hether firms develop and implement a supervisory plan reasonably
tailored to detect and prevent future misconduct by a particular broker
based on prior misconduct and regulatory disclosures. We will also
3. FINRA, RULE 3110(a) (2017).
4. See FINRA, 2016 REGULATORY AND EXAMINATION PRIORITIES LETTER, available
at http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/2016-regulatory-and-examinationpriorities-letter.pdf.
5. See FINRA, 2017 REGULATORY AND EXAMINATION PRIORITIES LETTER, available
at http://www finra.org/sites/default/files/2017-regulatory-and-examinationpriorities-letter.pdf.
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focus on firms with a concentration of brokers with significant past
disciplinary records or a number of sales practice complaints or
arbitrations.6
In 2018, FINRA’s examination priorities include fraud, high-risk brokers
and firms, suitability, and initial coin offerings and cryptocurrencies, among
other items.7 FINRA remains focused on brokers conducting business away
from their firms, including private securities transactions and outside
business activities.8
Although FINRA shifts its examination priorities each year to a different
aspect of supervision, firms are required to follow all of the supervision
rules. This article will examine the FINRA rules specifically dedicated to
supervision, including those portions of other rules which pertain to
supervision. This article will also discuss FINRA’s examination priorities,
including the guidance and best practices which FINRA has issued with
respect to supervision.

A. Supervisory Rules
FINRA supervisory rules mandate the establishment and maintenance of
written procedures, the designation of principals to establish and enforce
supervisory policies, and the designation of a Chief Compliance Officer.
FINRA has also promulgated rules which discuss firms’ supervisory
obligations with respect to OTC equities, day-trading accounts, senior
investors, direct participation programs, deferred variable annuity contracts,
options, and outside business activities and private securities transactions.

6. Id.
7. See FINRA, 2018 REGULATORY AND EXAMINATION PRIORITIES LETTER, available
at http://www finra.org/sites/default/files/2018-regulatory-and-examinationpriorities-letter.pdf.
8. Id.
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1. FINRA Rule 3110: Supervision
FINRA Rule 3110, which became effective in December 2014, requires
that the firm’s supervisory system provide for the establishment and
maintenance of written procedures.9
The rule further requires that
appropriately registered individuals be designated to carry out the
supervisory responsibilities of the firm.10 Each location of the firm must be
registered and designated as either a branch office or an office of supervisory
jurisdiction (OSJ), if it meets the definitions of the rule.11 Each branch and
OSJ must have a supervisor assigned to it, and each broker must be assigned
a supervisor.12 It is presumed that a principal will not be assigned to
supervise more than one OSJ, because “[t]he designated on-site principal for
each OSJ must have a physical presence, on a regular and routine basis, at
each OSJ for which the principal has supervisory responsibilities.”13 To the
extent the firm determines it is necessary for a principal to supervise more
than one OSJ, the firm must consider several factors, as well as document the
factors it used to determine why it considers the supervisory structure
reasonable.14
The firm’s written procedures must be specific to the type of business in
which the firm engages and the activities of its brokers.15 There must be
written procedures for the review of all transactions relating to the
investment banking or securities business of the member.16 FINRA does not
require that every transaction be reviewed if the firm uses a “reasonablydesigned risk-based review system that provides a member with sufficient
9. The prior supervision rule, NASD Rule 3010, contained many of the same
provisions. For purposes of this article, I will focus on the new FINRA rule. FINRA,
RULE 3110(a)(1) (2017).
10. FINRA, RULE 3110(A)(2) (2017).
11. FINRA, RULE 3110(A)(3) (2017).
12. FINRA, RULE 3110(A)(4) AND (5) (2017).
13. FINRA, RULE 3110.03 (Supp. 2017).
14. Id.
15. FINRA, RULE 3110(b)(1) (2017).
16. FINRA, RULE 3110(b)(2) (2017).
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information that permits the member to focus on the areas that pose the
greatest numbers and risks of violation.”17 FINRA describes “risk-based” as
“the type of methodology a firm may use to identify and prioritize for review
those areas that pose the greatest risk of potential securities laws and selfregulatory organization (SRO) rule violations.”18
Firms may utilize technology-based review systems with parameters
designed to assess which transactions merit further review; however, a
principal is required to review the parameters and to document that review in
writing.19 Even when relying on an automated supervisory system, the
principal remains “responsible for any deficiency in the system’s criteria that
would result in the system not being reasonably designed.”20
Firms must include procedures for reviewing all incoming and outgoing
correspondence (including electronic) as well as the internal communications
relating to the firm’s investment banking or securities business.21 Firms may
employ risk-based principles to review correspondence and internal
communications.22 Firms must also retain evidence of the review, either
electronically or on paper, which identifies the reviewer, the correspondence
or communication that was reviewed, the date of the review, and the actions
taken if any regulatory issues were raised by the review.23 To the extent a
firm utilizes a lexicon-based24 screening tool in its review of correspondence
17. FINRA, RULE 3110.05 (Supp. 2017).
18. FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 14-10: CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION RULES; SEC
APPROVES NEW SUPERVISION RULES, at 4, (Mar. 2014), available at
http://www finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p465940.pdf.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. FINRA, RULE 3110(b)(4) (2017).
22. FINRA, RULE3110.06 (Supp. 2017).
23. FINRA, RULE 3110.07 (Supp. 2017).
24. FINRA defines “lexicon-based” reviews as “those based on sensitive words or
phrases, the presence of which may signal problematic communications.” FINRA,
REGULATORY NOTICE 07-59: SUPERVISION OF ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS;
FINRA PROVIDES GUIDANCE REGARDING THE REVIEW AND SUPERVISION OF
ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS, at 12, (Dec. 2007), available at
http://www finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p037553.pdf.
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and communications, FINRA has reminded firms that those tools have
limitations and that firms should consider whether further supervisory review
is warranted.25
FINRA requires that firms have policies designed to “capture,
acknowledge, and respond to all written (including electronic) customer
complaints.”26 Although the rule does not apply to oral customer complaints,
FINRA has stated that “failure to address any customer complaint, written or
oral, may be a violation of FINRA Rule 2010 (Standards of Commercial
Honor and Principles of Trade).”27 FINRA has encouraged firms to provide
customers with a “form or other format that will allow customers to
communicate their complaints in writing.”28
Supervisory Personnel must also be supervised. Those who perform
supervisory functions may not (i) supervise their own activities; or (ii) report
to, or have their compensation or continued employment determined by, a
person they are supervising.29 This section replaced the section in the prior
NASD rule which was primarily concerned with producing branch managers.
The new rule is intended to address the supervision of all supervisory
personnel rather than just a small subset. The rule recognizes that there may
be circumstances where there may need to be exceptions. FINRA Rule
3110.10 reflects the expectation that the exception will be used sparingly,
such as in a single person firm, or where the person holds a very senior
executive position within the firm.
Firms must also have procedures in place which prevent the standards of
supervision from being compromised due to conflicts of interest that may be
present, including from the revenue generated by the broker being
supervised.30 This provision does not require the elimination of conflicts of

25. See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 14-10, at 6. See also FINRA, REGULATORY
NOTICE 07-59, at 12.
26. FINRA, RULE 3110(b)(5) (2017).
27. FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 14-10, at 7.
28. Id.
29. FINRA, RULE 3110(b)(6)(C) (2017).
30. FINRA, RULE 3110(b)(6)(D) (2017).
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interest, but requires that the “supervisory procedures be reasonably designed
despite the firm’s conflicts of interest.”31
Firms are required to conduct a review, at least annually, of the
businesses in which they engage.32 Firms must review the activities of each
of their offices, which includes an examination of customer accounts. Firms
must review every OSJ and supervisory branch office at least annually and
every non-supervisory branch office at least once every three years.33 The
review must include the testing and verification of the firm’s policies and
procedures related to:
a. safeguarding of customer funds and securities;
b. maintaining books and records;
c. supervision of supervisory personnel;
d. transmittal of funds or securities from customers to third parties;
and
e. changes of customer account information.34
Both the transmittal of funds and changes of customer account
information must have a means or method of customer confirmation,
notification or follow-up that can be documented.35 Customer account
information includes more than address and investment objective changes; it
includes changes to a customer’s name, marital status, telephone, and email
address as examples.36
The firm must ensure the integrity of inspections, as well as the
independence of the person conducting the inspection.37 This portion of the
rule is similar to that governing the supervision of supervisory personnel.
FINRA eliminated the production thresholds present in the prior rule which
triggered heightened office inspection requirements, and replaced them with
the more general principle that the firm should ensure that the inspection is
31. FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 14-10, at 8.
32. FINRA, RULE 3110(c) (2017).
33. FINRA, RULE 3110(c)(1)(A) and (B) (2017).
34. FINRA, RULE 3110(c)(2)(A) (2017).
35. FINRA, RULE 3110(c)(2)(B) and (C) (2017).
36. FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 14-10, at 10.
37. FINRA, RULE 3110(c)(3).
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not compromised due to conflicts of interest in all circumstances.38 This
does not require that the firm eliminate conflicts of interest, just that the firm
address the potential conflicts when establishing procedures for inspections.39
The firm must also establish policies and procedures designed to prevent
the misuse of material, non-public information by brokers.40 This section of
the rule addresses the procedures necessary to ensure that the rules and
regulations prohibiting insider trading are followed.
Finally, firms have an obligation to investigate “the good character,
business reputation, qualifications and experience” of brokers it intends to
hire.41 This review includes examining the broker’s most recently filed form
U5 or form CFTC Form 8-T.42 In addition, the firm must verify the accuracy
and completeness of information contained in the broker’s form U4 by, at a
minimum, searching reasonably available public records.43

2. FINRA Rule 3120: Supervisory Control System
In addition to the policies and procedures set forth above, firms must
designate one or more principals who will establish, maintain and enforce a
system of supervisory control policies that will test and verify that the firm’s
supervisory procedures are reasonably designed to achieve compliance with
applicable securities laws and regulations and with applicable FINRA rules.44
Those individuals are also responsible for creating additional supervisory
procedures or for making changes to the policies already in place based on
the outcomes of the testing and verification procedures.45 The principals

38. See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 14-10, at 11.
39. Id. at 12.
40. FINRA, RULE 3110(d) (2017).
41. FINRA, RULE 3110(e) (2017).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. FINRA, RULE 3120(a)(1) (2014).
45. FINRA, RULE 3120(a)(2) (2014).
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must submit a report to the firm’s senior management each year detailing the
supervisory controls and the test results.46 If the firm had $200 million or
more in gross revenue in the prior year, the report must include:
(i) a tabulation of the reports pertaining to customer complaints and
internal investigations made to FINRA during the preceding year;
and
(ii) discussion of the preceding year’s compliance efforts, including
procedures and educational programs, in each of the following areas:
a. trading and market activities;
b. investment banking activities;
c. antifraud and sales practices;
d. finance and operations;
e. supervision; and
f. anti-money laundering.47
These requirements are taken from NYSE Rule 342.48 They are meant to
provide valuable information to both FINRA’s regulatory program and to the
firm’s senior management.49

3. FINRA Rule 3130: Annual Certification of Compliance and
Supervisory Processes
FINRA must also designate a chief compliance officer on Schedule A of
Form BD.50 Each year, the firm’s chief executive officer must certify “that
the member has in place processes to establish, maintain, review, test and
modify written compliance policies and written supervisory procedures
reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable FINRA rules,
MSRB rules and federal securities laws and regulations, and that the chief
executive officer(s) has conducted one or more meetings with the chief
46. Id.
47. FINRA, RULE 3120(b) (2014).
48. See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 14-10, at 15.
49. Id.
50. FINRA, RULE 3130(a) (2008).
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compliance officer(s) in the preceding 12 months to discuss such
processes.”51

4. FINRA Rule 2114: OTC Equity Securities
FINRA Rule 2114 relates to recommendations to customers in OTC
Equity Securities. It places additional supervisory requirements on firms if a
broker makes such a recommendation. The firm is required to review the
current financial statements and material business information of the issuer
and make a determination that “such information, and any other information
available, provides a reasonable basis under the circumstances for making the
recommendation.”52 There are several securities which are excluded from
the heightened diligence of the rule. The rule does not apply to transactions
(i) that meet the requirements of Rule 504 of Regulation D; (ii) in an issuer’s
securities if the issuer has at least $50 million in total assets and $10 million
in shareholder equity; (iii) in securities of a bank or insurance company; or
(iv) in securities that have a bid price of at least $50 per share.53
This rule was adopted to address abuses in microcap stocks.54 The rule
does not supersede existing obligations. Rather, it places additional
obligations on the firm when making recommendations in microcap stocks.
A broker must still abide by the requirements of the suitability rule.

51. FINRA, RULE 3130(b) (2008).
52. FINRA, RULE 2114(a) (2011).
53. FINRA, RULE 2114(e) (2011).
54. See NASD, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 02-66: OTC EQUITY SECURITIES; SEC
APPROVES NASD RULE 2315; RECOMMENDATIONS TO CUSTOMERS IN OTC EQUITY
SECURITIES, (Oct. 2002), available at https://www finra.org/sites/default/files/
NoticeDocument/p003455.pdf.
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5. FINRA Rule 2130: Day-Trading Accounts
When a firm promotes day-trading strategies, it must have special
account opening procedures in place.55 The firm must provide the customer
with a day-trading risk disclosure statement, and must either approve the
account for day-trading or receive a written agreement from the customer
that the customer does not intend to use the account for purpose of engaging
in day-trading.56
To approve an account for day-trading, the firm must obtain essential
facts relative to the customer, including:
f.
investment objectives;
g.
investment and trading experience and knowledge;
h.
financial situation, including: estimated annual income from all
sources, estimated net worth (exclusive of family residence), and
estimated liquid net worth;
i.
tax status;
j.
employment status;
k.
marital status and number of dependents; and
l.
age.57
FINRA adopted heighted requirements for day-trading accounts because
this strategy often requires aggressive trading. It may require significant
capital and a sophisticated understanding of the securities markets and
trading techniques. This rule was adopted to address those investor
protection concerns.58

55. FINRA, RULE 2130(a)(1) (2013).
56. FINRA, RULE 2130(a)(1) and (2) (2013).
57. FINRA, RULE 2130(b) (2013).
58. See NASD, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 00-62: DAY-TRADING RULES; SEC APPROVES
DAY-TRADING RULES, (Sept. 2000), available at http://www.complinet.com/
file_store/pdf/rulebooks/nasd_0062.pdf.
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6. FINRA Rules 2165 and 4512: Senior Investors
FINRA has adopted rules to protect senior investors and other specified
persons from financial exploitation. FINRA is concerned about the increase
in financial exploitation of seniors.59 FINRA adopted Rule 2165 and
amended Rule 4512 to provide firms with tools to address suspected financial
exploitation of seniors faster and more effectively.60 The rules permit,
although do not mandate, that firms may contact a trusted contact person and
place a temporary hold on disbursements from a customer’s account if
financial exploitation is suspected.61
FINRA Rule 2165 allows a firm to place a temporary hold on
disbursements from accounts if the firm believes that financial exploitation is
occurring, has been attempted, or will be attempted.62 To rely on the
protections in the Rule, the firm must develop training policies or programs
that ensure associated persons comply with the requirements of the Rule.63
FINRA Rule 4512 obligated FINRA to obtain the “name of and contact
information for a trusted contact person age 18 or older who may be
contacted about the customer's account” for each account.64 A firm is
permitted to open the account without this information if the firm has made
reasonable attempts to obtain the information.65

59. See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 17-11: FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION OF
SENIORS; SEC APPROVES RULES RELATING TO FINANCIAL EXPLOITATION OF
SENIORS, (March 2017), available at http://finra.complinet.com/net_file_store/
new_rulebooks/r/e/Regulatory-Notice-17-11.pdf.
60. See id.
61. See id.
62. FINRA, RULE 2165(b)(1) (2018).
63. FINRA, RULE 2165.02 (2018).
64. FINRA, RULE 4512(a)(1)(F) (2018).
65. FINRA, RULE 4512.06 (2018).
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7. FINRA Rule 2310: Direct Participation Programs
FINRA requires that firms conduct additional diligence before
participating in a public offering of a direct participation program (DPP) or
REIT.66 The firm must obtain sufficient information from the sponsor to
determine that all material facts are adequately and accurately disclosed and
provide a basis for evaluating the program.67 At a minimum, the firm must
obtain information relating to:
(i)
items of compensation;
(ii) physical properties;
(iii) tax aspects;
(iv) financial stability and experience of the sponsor;
(v) the program’s conflict and risk factors; and
(vi) appraisals and other pertinent reports.68
The firm must also ensure that the general partner or sponsor of the DPP
or REIT will disclose a per share estimated value of the security in each
annual report distributed to investors.69 This was recently added to the rule
and is meant to address the general industry practice to use the offering price
for the DPP or REIT for years after the offering. This practice failed to
recognize that fees and costs may have reduced the investors’ principal or
that the underlying assets within the DPP or REIT may have decreased in
value.70 Investors should have more accurate pricing of their DPP or REIT
with this new section of the rule.

66. FINRA, RULE 2310(b)(3) (2016).
67. FINRA, RULE 2310(b)(3)(A) (2016).
68. FINRA, RULE 2310(b)(3)(B) (2016).
69. FINRA, RULE 2310(b)(5) (2016).
70. See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 15-02: DPP AND UNLISTED REIT SECURITIES;
SEC APPROVES AMENDMENTS TO FINRA RULE 2310 AND NASD RULE 2340 TO
ADDRESS VALUES OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION PROGRAM AND UNLISTED REAL
ESTATE INVESTMENT TRUST SECURITIES, (Jan. 2015), available at
https://www finra.org/sites/default/files/notice_doc_file_ref/Notice_Regulatory_1502.pdf.
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8. FINRA Rule 2330: Deferred Variable Annuity Contracts
Firms have specific suitability and supervisory obligations when selling
deferred variable annuity contracts.71 A broker must obtain the following
information prior to making a recommendation to purchase or exchange a
deferred variable annuity contract:
(i)
the customer’s age;
(ii) annual income;
(iii) financial situation and needs;
(iv) investment experience;
(v) investment objectives;
(vi) intended use of the deferred variable annuity;
(vii) investment time horizon;
(viii) existing assets (including investment and life insurance holdings);
(ix) liquidity needs;
(x) liquid net worth;
(xi) risk tolerance;
(xii) tax status; and
(xiii) such other information used or considered to be reasonable by the
firm in making the recommendation.72
A principal must review the application and approve it prior to
transmitting it to the issuing insurance company if the supervisor determines
the transaction is suitable for the customer.73 The firm must have specific
written supervisory policies and procedures for sales and exchanges of
deferred variable annuity contracts.74 The policies must specifically examine
whether individual brokers have excessive annuity exchange rates which
suggest the policies and procedures governing heightened scrutiny of annuity
exchanges are not effective.75

71. FINRA, RULE 2330 (2014).
72. FINRA, RULE 2330(b)(2) (2014).
73. FINRA, RULE 2330(c) (2014).
74. FINRA, RULE 2330(d) (2014).
75. Id.
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In addition to the requirements set forth in the rule, FINRA has provided
additional guidance to firms with respect to their supervisory obligations
over variable annuity replacement transactions. In particular, firms are to
pay close attention to replacements by brokers who have recently switched
firms to ensure that recommendations are not a function of the desire of the
broker to obtain compensation that would be lost if the customer were to
retain the previously sold investment.76 Specifically, firms are to do the
following:
For a reasonable period following the association of a new
representative, the new firm should review replacements
recommended by the associated person with a view to identifying
any recommendations to liquidate or surrender mutual funds or
variable products that may be inconsistent with the customer’s
investment needs and objectives or that have not been preceded by
appropriate disclosure to the customer. Special supervisory
consideration should be given to those transactions involving the
replacement of a customer’s existing variable annuity product with a
“bonus variable annuity” offered by the new firm. The firm should
review these transactions with a view to ensuring that full disclosure
is made to the customer regarding all fees, expenses and surrender
charges that may apply to the replacement product; a “bonus” on
premium payments may not be considered an “offset” against any
other fees or expenses, including surrender charges applied to the
replaced product.77
This guidance is applicable to both variable annuities as well as mutual
funds.

76. NASD, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 07-06: SUPERVISION OF RECOMMENDATIONS AFTER
A REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVE CHANGES FIRMS; SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS WHEN
SUPERVISING RECOMMENDATIONS OF NEWLY ASSOCIATED REGISTERED
REPRESENTATIVES TO REPLACE MUTUAL FUNDS AND VARIABLE PRODUCTS, (Feb.
2007), available at https://www finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/
p018630.pdf.
77. Id.at 4.
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9. FINRA Rule 2360: Options
Before a firm is allowed to accept any options transactions for a
customer, the customer must first be provided with certain disclosures, and
the account must specifically be approved for options trading.78 The firm
must obtain the following information about the customer:
(i)
investment objectives;
(ii) employment status;
(iii) estimated annual income from all sources;
(iv) estimated net worth (exclusive of family residence);
(v) estimated liquid net worth;
(vi) marital status and number of dependents;
(vii) age; and
(viii) investment experience and knowledge for options, stocks and
bonds, commodities, and other financial instruments.79
Firms must ensure that the supervisory policies adequately address the
firm’s options business.80

78. FINRA, RULE 2360(b)(16)(A) and (B) (2014).
79. FINRA, RULE 2360(b)(16)(B)(i) (2014).
80. FINRA, RULE 2360(b)(20) (2014).
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10. FINRA Rules 3270 and 3280: Outside Business Activities and
Private Securities Transactions
A broker may not receive compensation from any outside business
activity without providing prior written notice to the firm.81 Upon receipt of
the notice from a broker, the firm must consider whether the activity will:
“(1) interfere with or otherwise compromise the registered person’s
responsibilities to the member and/or the member's customers or (2) be
viewed by customers or the public as part of the member’s business based
upon, among other factors, the nature of the proposed activity and the
manner in which it will be offered.”82 The firm may place conditions on the
activity or prohibit the activity.83
Prior to participating in any private securities transaction, a broker must
also provide written notice to the firm.84 If the broker is to receive
compensation for the transaction, the firm must advise the broker whether it
approves or disapproves of the broker’s participation in the proposed
transaction.85 Both of these rules relate to a broker engaging in business
“away from the firm,” and stem from FINRA’s concerns about a broker not
being properly supervised when doing so.
FINRA has expressed concern about issues involving sales of promissory
notes, which may or may not be securities, and many of which have been
fraudulent.86 FINRA has suggested that firms ensure that they are adequately
educating their brokers regarding the importance of reporting all sales of
notes, whether securities products or not.87 FINRA has also suggested that
81. FINRA, RULE 3270 (2015).
82. FINRA, RULE 3270.01 (Supp. 2015).
83. Id.
84. FINRA, RULE 3280(b) (2017).
85. FINRA, RULE 3280(c)(1)(A) and (B) (2017).
86. See NASD, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 01-79: SELLING AWAY AND OUTSIDE
BUSINESS ACTIVITIES; NASD REMINDS MEMBERS OF THEIR RESPONSIBILITIES
REGARDING PRIVATE SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS INVOLVING NOTES AND OTHER
SECURITIES AND OUTSIDE BUSINESS ACTIVITIES, (Dec. 2001), available at
https://www finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p003677.pdf.
87. Id.
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firms “might consider conducting ‘preventive compliance conferences’ that
specifically address selling notes away from the firm.”88
In its 2018 examination priorities, FINRA has stated that it will “assess
firms’ ability to monitor the proper use of proceeds from [private securities
transactions]” and will assess whether the brokers have made the appropriate
disclosures about “interest in, control of, or association with the issuer.”89
With respect to outside business activities, FINRA will examine firm’s
controls to identify when a broker has borrowed money from a customer or
made payments to a customer form the broker’s outside business bank
accounts.90

B. Examination Priorities and Supervisory Guidance
FINRA has focused its supervision-related examination priorities on a
number of different areas over the past few years, and has issued guidance
specifying best practices for supervision when dealing with these issues.
This guidance flows from the general and specific supervisory rules. For
example, FINRA has discussed the supervision related to various conflicts of
interest, the heightened supervision that may be necessary when supervising
a problem broker to ensure that the broker complies with applicable
securities laws and regulations and with applicable FINRA rules, and
concerns that may arise when dealing with senior customers.

1. Conflicts of Interest
FINRA has become concerned with conflicts of interest, and how those
conflicts are managed. In 2016, FINRA focused its examinations on conflicts
related to incentive structures, as well as investment banking and research,
among other areas of focus.

88. Id. at 699.
89. FINRA, 2018 REGULATORY AND EXAMINATION PRIORITIES LETTER, at 2.
90. Id.
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a. Incentive Structure Conflicts
FINRA has several concerns associated with a firm’s incentive
compensation structures and conflicts of interest. FINRA is concerned with
the conflicts of interest connected to a firm’s sales of proprietary or affiliated
products, or products for which a firm receives third-party payments such as
revenue sharing.91 Another concern relates to the financial incentives a
broker may receive when hired, which may be driven by the assets a broker
transfers to the new firm and may create conflicts of interest.92 FINRA is
also concerned with advice concerning “wealth events” such as IRA
rollovers, which present opportunities to invest large sums of money at a
single time.93

i. Differential Compensation Structures
Many firms offer compensation structures which vary based on the
product being sold, or the amount of revenue the broker has generated. This
may create tensions between the broker’s own interests and the interests of
the client.
FINRA Rule 2111, “Suitability,” requires that a broker “have a
reasonable basis to believe that a recommended transaction or investment
strategy involving a security or securities is suitable for the customer, based
on the information obtained through the reasonable diligence of the member
or associated person to ascertain the customer’s investment profile.”94
In the past, the SEC has sanctioned a firm for establishing a
compensation structure that provided substantially higher payouts to its
brokers for stocks covered by the firm’s research department.95 The
91. See FINRA, 2016 REGULATORY AND EXAMINATION PRIORITIES LETTER.
92. Id.
93. See FINRA, 2015 REGULATORY AND EXAMINATION PRIORITIES LETTER,
available at http://www finra.org/sites/default/files/p602239.pdf.
94. FINRA, RULE 2111(a) (2014).
95. In the Matter of Olde Disc. Corp., S.E.C. Release No. 7577, Release No. 40423,
Release No. 33-7577, Release No. 34-40423, 1998 WL 575171 (Sept. 10, 1998).
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production requirements and position quotas that the firm imposed on its
brokers had the effect of requiring the brokers, if they were to be successful,
to concentrate their selling efforts on the firm covered stocks. A number of
customers with conservative investment needs and objectives ended up with
most or all of their assets concentrated in these firm covered stocks. The SEC
found that the brokers had violated their suitability obligation to these
customers, and the firm had failed to establish a system of supervision which
would prevent such violations. In fact, the compensation structure
established by the firm contributed to such violations.
Following the SEC sanction, FINRA examined whether differential
compensation structures should be prohibited with respect to proprietary
products:
The Tully Report concluded that the payment of higher
compensation to registered representatives for the sale of proprietary
products can create incentives to inappropriately favor such products
over nonproprietary products. Such compensation arrangements can
create conflicts of interest by encouraging representatives to
recommend proprietary products to maximize their commissions,
rather than to best meet their customers’ needs. Such arrangements
may provide point-of-sale incentives that could compromise proper
customer suitability determinations and may present a situation
where the salesperson’s interests are not, in some circumstances,
fully aligned with the interests of customers. In this regard, the Tully
Report cited as a “best practice” the use of identical payout ratios for
representatives that offer both proprietary and non-proprietary
products, noting that most firms interviewed had already adopted this
practice.96
FINRA (NASD at the time) sought comment on whether such
compensation should be prohibited specifically with respect to mutual funds.
While this proposal was never adopted, FINRA had already implemented
prohibitions on incentives which favor one mutual fund over another on the

96. NASD, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 99-81: SALESPERSON COMPENSATION PRACTICES;
NASD REGULATION REQUESTS COMMENT ON PROPOSED SALESPERSON
COMPENSATION RULES, at 607, (Sept.1999), available at http://www finra.org/sites/
default/files/NoticeDocument/p004080.pdf.
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basis of the commission paid by the mutual fund. For example, a firm may
not:
[P]rovide to salesmen, branch managers or other sales personnel any
incentive or additional compensation for the sale of shares of specific
investment companies based on the amount of brokerage
commissions received or expected from any source, including such
investment companies or any covered account. Included in this
prohibition are bonuses, preferred compensation lists, sales incentive
campaign or contests, or any other method of compensation which
provides an incentive to sales personnel to favor or disfavor any
investment company or group of investment companies based on
brokerage commissions.97
Although these prohibitions had been in effect for several decades, the
concerns remained that brokers had been improperly incentivized to favor
specific mutual funds or proprietary products. When considering whether to
prohibit differentiated compensation, FINRA questioned whether potential
conflicts of interest may already be adequately addressed by existing rules,
such as the suitability rule.98
With respect to proprietary products, FINRA has issued guidance to
firms when bringing new products to the market.99 FINRA asked firms to
consider the following questions when designing their policies and
procedures:
 What costs and fees for the investor are associated with this
product? Why are they appropriate? Are all of the costs and
fees transparent? How do they compare with comparable
products offered by the firm or by competitors?
 How will the firm and registered representatives be compensated
for offering the product? Will the offering of the product create
any conflicts of interest between the customer and any part of the
firm or its affiliates? If so, how will those conflicts be
97. FINRA, RULE 2341(k)(7)(A) (2017).
98. See NASD, Notice to Members 99-81.
99. See NASD, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 05-26: NEW PRODUCTS; NASD RECOMMENDS
BEST PRACTICES FOR REVIEWING NEW PRODUCTS, (April 2005), available at
http://www finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p013755.pdf.
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addressed? For example, does the firm stand to benefit from the
sale of the product beyond the clearly disclosed sales charges or
commissions (i.e., revenue sharing arrangements)? If so, the
firm may have an obligation under NASD Rule 2110, governing
just and equitable principles of trade, to disclose that conflict,
even if the product is otherwise suitable, generally or for a
particular investor.100
Answering these questions can help a firm determine whether the
conflicts of interest are so insurmountable that the product should not even
be offered.
Given the focus on potential conflicts with proprietary products, FINRA
examined firms and their policies and practices to avoid those conflicts:
An effective practice is that for comparable products, firms not
provide higher compensation, or provide other rewards, for the sale
of proprietary products or products from providers with which the
firm has entered into revenue-sharing agreements. The firms with
which FINRA met each stated that their registered representatives
are not compensated more highly for the sale of comparable
proprietary or preferred provider products.101
Accordingly, firms avoid incentivizing the sale of proprietary products
by not differentiating the compensation.

ii. Recruitment Compensation
For some time, FINRA has been concerned with conflicts that may arise
when a broker moves from one firm to another. Conflicts may arise in a
number of different ways.
On occasion, clients will hold securities in their accounts that are
proprietary to the broker’s prior firm, and accordingly, may not be
transferred to the broker’s new firm. Alternatively, clients may hold
products from issuers with whom the broker’s new firm does not have a
100. Id.
101. FINRA, REPORT ON CONFLICTS OF INTEREST, at 30, (Oct. 2013), available at
http://www finra.org/sites/default/files/Industry/p359971.pdf.
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dealer or servicing agreement. As a result, the clients may not transfer those
specific products even if they transfer the rest of their accounts to the broker
at the new firm. Concerned that brokers may have been making inappropriate
recommendations to liquidate these products to permit the transfer of the
assets to the broker’s new firm, as discussed above, FINRA issued a notice
reminding firms of their supervisory obligations in such a situation.102
Specifically, FINRA noted:
A recommendation to liquidate, replace or surrender an existing
investment must be suitable and based upon the customer’s
investment needs and not the financial needs of the firm or its
associated persons. See, e.g., Notice to Members 99-35 (May 1999).
A firm may consider the fact that the firm lacks a dealer or servicing
agreement with the product sponsor and, therefore, the registered
representative cannot provide the customer with the service that the
customer desires with respect to the product. The suitability analysis
must also include other considerations, however, including whether
the customer’s mutual fund or variable product is subject to a
contingent deferred sales charge or a required holding (surrender)
period, or has other features that materially affect its value or
liquidity, and the fees and expenses associated with the new product
being recommended.103
Accordingly, while a broker may consider the fact that he can no longer
service the investment, such a consideration may not trump the overall
suitability analysis in making a recommendation to liquidate the investment.
In addition to conflicts related to potentially improper investment advice
for products that are not portable, FINRA has also been concerned with
compensation paid to brokers when they move from one firm to another.
Brokers may be paid upfront compensation which is dependent on the
broker’s production over the past twelve months. Brokers may also receive
certain bonuses dependent on the assets they are able to transfer to their new
firm.
FINRA has now mandated that firms provide customers with educational
material which will alert clients to these potential conflicts as well as the fact
102. See NASD, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 07-06.
103. Id. at 3.
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that all assets may not be portable to the broker’s new firm.104 As of
November 2016, firms are required to provide clients with a communication
highlighting the following potential implications of transferring assets to the
new firm:
 whether financial incentives the representative receives may
create a conflict of interest;
 that some assets may not be directly transferrable to the
recruiting firm and as a result the customer may incur costs to
liquidate and move those assets or incur account maintenance
fees to leave them with his or her current firm;
 potential costs related to transferring assets to the recruiting firm,
including differences in the pricing structure and fees the
customer’s current firm and the recruiting firm impose; and
 differences in products and services between the customer’s
current firm and the recruiting firm.105
FINRA’s intent is that clients will seek additional information from their
broker if they find this information relevant to their decision to transfer their
assets to the broker at the new firm.

iii. Wealth Events
FINRA expects firms to scrutinize “wealth” events or “lifecycle
milestone” events. Such events include key liquidity events in an investor’s
life, such as when an investor retires or changes jobs. At such a time, the
investor must decide what to do with his or her 401(k) – leave it with the
employer’s plan or roll it over to an IRA. These events have the potential to
heighten conflicts of interest because of the potentially large sums of money
involved. This was a focus of FINRA in its Conflict of Interest Report:

104. FINRA, RULE 2273 (2016).
105. FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 16-18: RECRUITMENT PRACTICES; SEC
APPROVES RULE REQUIRING DELIVERY OF AN EDUCATIONAL COMMUNICATION TO
CUSTOMERS OF A TRANSFERRING REPRESENTATIVE, (May 2016), available at
http://www finra.org/sites/default/files/notice_doc_file_ref/Regulatory-Notice-1618.pdf.
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Firms have a strong incentive to gather assets, and as a recent
Government Accountability Office report noted, “(r)ollovers have
become the largest source of contributions to IRAs.” It is not always
clear, however, that rolling over a 401(k) to an IRA—as opposed to
keeping money within the plan or rolling it over to a new employer’s
plan—is the best option for an investor. The recommendations a
representative makes at these points in time may have profound
implications for the investor and deserve thorough scrutiny and
review.106
Firms should supervise such recommendations closely to ensure that
recommendations are consistent with the suitability rule.
Beginning in 2017, firms are required to comply with the Department of
Labor’s Conflict of Interest Rule with respect to recommendations related to
rollovers from 401(k)s to IRAs.107 If a broker is paid a variety of
compensation for such a recommendation, the broker is required to adhere to
impartial conduct standards pursuant to the Best Interest Contract
Exemption.108

b. Investment Banking and Research Conflicts
For years, firms have been faced with conflicts of interest in connection
with their investment banking and research lines of business. In 2002,
investigations into major firms uncovered quid pro quo arrangements
between the firms and their investment banking clients where the firms’

106. FINRA, REPORT ON CONFLICTS OF INTERESTS, at 31.
107. See Definition of the Term ‘‘Fiduciary’’; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement
Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 20946 (April 8, 2016), available at
https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-04-08/pdf/2016-07924.pdf.
108. See Best Interest Contact Exemption, 81 Fed. Reg. 21002 (Apr. 6, 2016),
available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-04-08/pdf/2016-07925.pdf;
Best Interest Contract Exemption; Correction, 81 Fed. Reg. 44773 (Jul. 11, 2016),
available at https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2016-07-11/pdf/2016-16355.pdf.
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research department issued favorable research reports in exchange for
investment banking business.109
FINRA has remained concerned with conflicts of interest in connection
with research reports. FINRA Rule 2241 requires firms to manage certain
conflicts and prohibits others when issuing equity research. Rule 2241(b)(1)
contains an overarching requirement that firms establish, maintain and
enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed to identify and
effectively manage conflicts of interest related to the preparation, content and
distribution of research reports and public appearances by research analysts
and the interaction between research analysts and persons outside of the
research department, including investment banking and sales and trading
personnel, the subject companies and customers. The rule now prohibits
prepublication review by individuals in investment banking.110 The rule also
incorporates an information barrier requirement, which is meant to ensure
that research analysts are insulated from the review, pressure or oversight by
persons engaged in investment banking services activities, as well as other
persons, including sales and trading personnel, who might be biased in their
judgment or supervision.111
FINRA has also adopted a similar rule with respect to debt research
reports.112 The rule contains many of the same provisions as the equity
109. See Press Release, New York Attorney General Eric T. Schneiderman, Merrill
Lynch Stock Rating System Found Biased By Undisclosed Conflicts Of Interest
(April 8, 2002), available at https://www.ag ny.gov/press-release/merrill-lynchstock-rating-system-found-biased-undisclosed-conflicts-interest; see also Press
Release, SEC, Ten of Nation's Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement Actions
Involving Conflicts of Interest Between Research and Investment Banking, (April 28,
2003), available at https://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm.
110. See FINRA, RULE 2241(b)(2)(A) (2015), see also FINRA, REGULATORY
NOTICE 15-30: EQUITY RESEARCH; SEC APPROVES CONSOLIDATED RULE TO
ADDRESS CONFLICTS OF INTEREST RELATING TO THE PUBLICATION AND
DISTRIBUTION OF EQUITY RESEARCH REPORTS, (Aug. 2015), available at
https://www finra.org/sites/default/files/notice_doc_file_ref/Regulatory-Notice-1530.pdf.
111. See FINRA, RULE 2241(b)(2)(G) (2015); see also FINRA, REGULATORY
NOTICE 15-30 (Aug. 2015).
112. See FINRA, Rule 2242 (2016); see also FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 15-31:
DEBT RESEARCH; SEC APPROVES RULE TO ADDRESS CONFLICTS OF INTEREST
RELATING TO THE PUBLICATION AND DISTRIBUTION OF DEBT RESEARCH REPORTS,
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research rule, and is aimed at managing or prohibiting the same types of
conflicts while acknowledging the differences inherent in the debt markets.113
FINRA’s tightening of the rules relating to conflicts of interest with
respect to research reports follow a settlement in 2014 where 10 firms were
fined a total of $43.5 million.114 The firms allowed their equity research
analysts to solicit investment banking business. Additionally, the firms
offered favorable research coverage in connection with the 2010 planned
initial public offering of Toys “R” Us.
A few weeks earlier, FINRA fined Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. $15
million for supervisory failures related to its research department.115
Citigroup research analysts attended client dinners where they discussed
stock picks, which, in some instances, were inconsistent with the analysts’
published research. Additionally, a research analyst assisted two issuers in
preparing presentations for investment banking road shows.

(Aug. 2015), available at http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/RegulatoryNotice15-31.pdf.
113. See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 15-31, supra note 101.
114. See Press Release, FINRA, FINRA Fines 10 Firms a Total of $43.5 Million for
Allowing Equity Research Analysts to Solicit Investment Banking Business and for
Offering Favorable Research Coverage in Connection With Toys“R”Us IPO,
(Dec.11, 2014), available at http://www finra.org/newsroom/2014/finra-fines-10firms-total-435-million.
115. See Press Release, FINRA, FINRA Fines Citigroup Global Markets Inc. $15
Million for Supervisory Failures Related to Equity Research and Involvement in IPO
Roadshows, (Nov. 24, 2014), available at http://www finra.org/newsroom/2014/
finra-fines-citigroup-15-million-failures-related-equity-research.
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2. Problem Brokers
The NASD, FINRA’s predecessor, issued several notices providing
guidance to firms regarding the appropriate level of supervision when
overseeing a broker with a history of customer complaints. The guidance
states that heightened supervision is often appropriate when the firm is
supervising a broker with such a history.
In 1997, the NASD and the NYSE issued guidance following widespread
examinations of the sales practices of firms. The agencies noted several red
flags that may trigger heightened supervision:
(i) brokers with a history of customer complaints, disciplinary actions,
or arbitrations;
(ii) persons hired in a non-registered capacity who previously were
employed as brokers and who have such a history;
(iii) brokers who develop such a history while associated with the firm;
(iv) brokers terminated from prior employment for what appears to be a
significant sales practice or regulatory violation; or
(v) brokers who have had a frequent change of employers within the
industry.116
FINRA provided guidance on developing a program of heightened
supervision, and suggested that firms consider the nature of the conduct that
resulted in the broker having a checkered history. FINRA suggested that
firms examine “the product, customer, or activity type” and “identify the
level and type of risk it presents. The firm should then determine what type
of supervision might best control and limit this type of risk.”117
In 1999, the NASD issued additional guidance on supervision, once
again reminding firms that they should “design a supervisory system that is
current and appropriately tailored to its specific attributes and structure”
including “whether the firm employs persons who should be subject to
heightened supervisory procedures due to a history of customer complaints,
disciplinary actions, or arbitration proceedings.”118 In 2008, in highlighting
116. See NASD, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 97-19: NASD REGULATION AND NEW YORK
STOCK EXCHANGE MEMORANDUM DISCUSSES SWEEP REPORT AND PROVIDES
GUIDANCE ON HEIGHTENED SUPERVISION RECOMMENDATIONS, at 160, (April 1997),
available at http://www finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p004826.pdf.
117. Id. at 161-162.
118. See NASD, NOTICE TO MEMBERS 99-45: NASD PROVIDES GUIDANCE ON
SUPERVISORY RESPONSIBILITIES, at 294, (June 1999), available at
http://www finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p004311.pdf.
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“new and existing areas that are of particular significance to FINRA’s
examination program,” FINRA reminded firms that they “should also have
procedures in place for reviewing and identifying individuals or business
types that require enhanced scrutiny due to sales practice concerns, such as a
pattern of customer complaints.”119
In 2011, FINRA issued a joint National Exam Risk Alert with the
SEC.120 FINRA had found that “firms with significant deficiencies in the
integrity of their overall branch inspection process” typically “lack
heightened supervision of individuals with disciplinary histories or
individuals previously associated with a firm with a disciplinary history.”121
FINRA has emphasized its concern about this issue by making it a
regulatory and examination priority.122 In 2014, FINRA stated:
In addition, FINRA is concerned about the potential risks posed by
brokers who formerly worked at one or more firms that have been
severely disciplined by FINRA, and who may bring unethical or
illegal practices to a firm. Using sophisticated analytics—known as
the Broker Migration Model—FINRA identifies and monitors both
brokers who move from a firm that has been expelled or otherwise
has a serious disciplinary history to another FINRA-regulated firm,
and the firms that hire such individuals.123
In 2015, FINRA stated that it was specifically focused on the supervision
of high-risk brokers to determine whether it has been “tailored to specifically
address the risks associated with the particular individual based on prior
misconduct and regulatory disclosures.”124 In 2017, FINRA once again made
this issue an examination priority. In its 2017 Regulatory and Examinations
Priority Letter, FINRA stated, “FINRA will devote particular attention to
119. See FINRA, 2008 EXAMINATION PRIORITIES, at 1, 4, available at
http://www finra.org/sites/default/files/Industry/p038169.pdf.
120. See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 11-54: BRANCH OFFICE INSPECTIONS;
FINRA AND THE SEC ISSUE JOINT GUIDANCE ON EFFECTIVE POLICIES AND
PROCEDURES FOR BROKER-DEALER BRANCH INSPECTIONS, (Nov. 2011), available at
http://www finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p125204.pdf.
121. Id. at 2.
122. See FINRA, 2014 REGULATORY AND EXAMINATION PRIORITIES LETTER,
available at http://www finra.org/sites/default/files/Industry/p419710.pdf.
123. Id. at 3 (FINRA has placed this under the section entitled “Focus on Recidivist
Brokers”).
124. FINRA, 2015 REGULATORY AND EXAMINATION PRIORITIES LETTER, at 9.
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firms’ hiring and monitoring of high-risk and recidivist brokers, including
whether firms establish appropriate supervisory and compliance controls for
such persons.”125
In May 2017, the FINRA Board discussed several steps designed to
heighten the oversight of high-risk brokers and the firms that employ them,
including, among other things, “publication of a Regulatory Notice
rearticulating heightened supervision obligations under FINRA Rule 3110
(Supervision)” and “publication of a Regulatory Notice proposing
amendments to FINRA Rule 8312 (FINRA BrokerCheck Disclosure) to
disclose a member’s status as a ‘taping firm’ under FINRA Rule 3170.”126
In 2018, FINRA stated it would continue to focus on the sales practices
of high-risk brokers, including the recommendation of speculative or
complex products.127 FINRA once again reminded firms of their obligation
to “adopt and implement tailored heightened supervisory procedures under
FINRA Rule 3110 (Supervision) for high-risk individuals.”128
3. Senior Investors
As discussed above, FINRA recently adopted rules designed to mitigate
financial exploitation of seniors.129 In addition, FINRA has noted that there
may be special concerns related to senior investors and firms may be better
served by having policies and procedures in place to address these concerns.
FINRA has expressed particular concern with the suitability of
recommendations to, and communication aimed at, senior investors.130
With respect to recommendations, FINRA reminded firms that a
customer’s investment time horizons, goals, risk tolerance, and tax status
125. FINRA, 2017 REGULATORY AND EXAMINATION PRIORITIES LETTER, at 2.
126. See Robert Cook, Update: FINRA Board of Governors Meeting, FINRA (May
11, 2017), http://www finra.org/industry/update-finra-board-governors-meeting051017.
127. See FINRA, 2018 REGULATORY AND EXAMINATION PRIORITIES LETTER, at 2.
128. Id.
129. See FINRA, RULES 2165 and 4512.
130. See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 07-43: SENIOR INVESTORS; FINRA REMINDS
FIRMS OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS RELATING TO SENIOR INVESTORS AND HIGHLIGHTS
INDUSTRY PRACTICES TO SERVE THESE CUSTOMERS, (Sept. 2007), available at
http://www finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p036816.pdf.
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may change as the customer ages.131 FINRA has cautioned firms that
customers who are at or near retirement may be tempted to “reach for yield
to maximize retirement income without the appreciation for the concomitant
risk.”132 In particular, FINRA examiners are focused on broker
recommendations that involve the following:
(i) Products that have withdrawal penalties or otherwise lack liquidity,
such as deferred variable annuities, equity indexed annuities, some
real estate investments and limited partnerships;
(ii) Variable life settlements;
(iii) Complex structured products, such as collateralized debt obligations
(CDOs);
(iv) Mortgaging home equity for investment purposes; and
(v) Using retirement savings, including early withdrawals from IRAs,
to invest in high-risk investments.133
In addition to suitability, FINRA has focused on communications.
FINRA has expressed concern with the use of professional designations, in
particular those suggesting an expertise in retirement planning or financial
services for seniors.134 Some firms ban the use of senior designations, while
others require approval before they are used.135 FINRA does not opine on
the best practice.
FINRA has also been concerned with “free lunch” seminars that use
high-pressure sales tactics under the guise of educational seminars to sell
unsuitable products, predominately to senior investors. Generally, the
seminars have been conducted in violation of FINRA rules. Accordingly,
FINRA has reminded firms to review their policies and procedures related to
sales seminars to ensure that they are adequate to ensure compliance with the
rules and regulations.136
Last, FINRA expressed concern regarding dealing with investors
exhibiting signs of diminished mental capacity, as well as those who may be
131. Id. at 2.
132. Id. at 3.
133. Id. at 4.
134. Id. at 5.
135. See id. at 5. See also FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 11-52: SENIOR
DESIGNATIONS; FINRA REMINDS FIRMS OF THEIR OBLIGATIONS REGARDING THE
SUPERVISION OF REGISTERED PERSONS USING SENIOR DESIGNATIONS, (Nov. 2011),
available at http://www finra.org/sites/default/files/NoticeDocument/p125092.pdf.
136. See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 07-43, at 6.
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suffering from financial abuse by a family member or caregiver. FINRA
outlined several policies and procedures a firm may adopt for dealing with
these issues:
(i)
Designating a specific individual or department, such as the
compliance or legal department, to serve as a central advisory
contact for questions about senior issues, as well as a repository of
available resources.
(ii) Providing written guidance to employees on senior-related issues,
such as how to identify and/or what to do if they suspect their
customer is experiencing diminished capacity or is being abused,
financially or otherwise, by a family member, caregiver or other
third party.
(iii) Asking, either at account opening or at a later point, whether the
customer has executed a durable power of attorney.
(iv) Asking, either at account opening or at a later time, whether the
customer would like to designate a secondary or emergency
contact for the account whom the firm could contact if it could not
contact the customer or had concerns about the customer’s
whereabouts or health.
(v) Asking the customer if he or she would like to invite a friend or
family member to accompany the customer to appointments at the
firm.
(vi) Informing the customer (where appropriate) that, in the firm’s
view, a particular unsolicited trade is not suitable for the customer.
(vii) Reminding brokers that it is important when dealing with
customers, particularly seniors, to base recommendations on
current information.
(viii) Offering training to help brokers understand and meet the needs of
older investors, including proper asset allocation, liquidity demand
and longevity needs, as well as the possible changes in their
suitability profiles.137
Protecting senior investors remains a priority for FINRA. FINRA
completed an examination initiative on senior initiatives, and has urged firms
to review their procedures to “identify ways they may be able to improve
their treatment of senior investors.”138 With respect to its examination
priorities in 2017, FINRA stated:

137. Id. at 7-8.
138. FINRA, 2015 REGULATORY AND EXAMINATION PRIORITIES LETTER, at 10.
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FINRA will assess firms’ controls to protect senior investors from fraud,
abuse and improper advice. We are seeing numerous cases where
registered representatives have recommended that senior investors
purchase speculative or complex products in search of yield. While the
quest for higher yield is not per se problematic, FINRA will assess
whether such recommendations were suitable given an investor’s profile
and risk tolerance, and whether firms have appropriate supervisory
mechanisms in place to detect and prevent problematic sales practices.139
In 2015, FINRA established the FINRA Securities Helpline for Seniors,
which is a “toll-free number that senior investors can call to get assistance
from FINRA or raise concerns about issues with brokerage accounts and
investments.”140 In two years, “the helpline has fielded more than 9,200 calls
from all 50 states from individuals ranging in age from 17 to 102 years old
(the average age of callers is 70 years old), and staff have referred nearly 650
matters to state, federal and foreign regulators, and made more than 130
referrals to Adult Protective Services under the mandatory reporting laws of
16 states.”141 As of its second anniversary in April 2017, the helpline has led
to $4.3 million in voluntary reimbursements to callers.142
Conclusion
Brokerage firm supervisory obligations are complex and less than clear.
The rules are primarily principle based, offering the firms wide latitude in
determining the appropriate level of supervision given the firm’s structure.
However, the FINRA guidance issued to firms will often set forth FINRA’s
expectations as to what an adequate supervisory system will look like. By
examining the rules, the guidance, and disciplinary actions, one may get a
clearer picture of a firm’s supervisory obligations.

139. FINRA, 2017 REGULATORY AND EXAMINATION PRIORITIES LETTER, at 3.
140. FINRA Securities Helpline for Seniors, FINRA, http://www.finra.org/investors/
highlights/finra-securities-helpline-seniors (last visited Feb. 26, 2018).
141. FINRA Senior Helpline Marks Second Anniversary With $4.3 Million in
Voluntary Reimbursements to Callers, FINRA (April 20, 2017),
http://www finra.org/newsroom/2017/finra-senior-helpline-marks-secondanniversary-43-million-voluntary-reimbursements.
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